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 July 25, 2014 Draft—Not for Quotation or Attribution 
The Uncertain Future of the Corporate Contribution Ban 
Richard Briffault 
I. Introduction 
Concern about the role of corporate money in corrupting democracy has been a longstanding 
theme in American politics. In the late nineteenth century, the states began to adopt laws restricting the 
use of corporate funds in elections. The first permanent federal campaign finance law – the Tillman Act 
of 1907 – targeted corporations by prohibiting federally-chartered corporations from making 
contributions in any election and prohibiting all corporations from making contributions in federal 
elections. Subsequently amended, continued, and strengthened by the Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 
1925, the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947, the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, and the Bipartisan 
Campaign Reform Act of 2002, the federal ban on the contribution of corporate funds to federal 
candidates and to political parties and political committees that contribute to federal candidates is still 
on the books. Twenty-one states also prohibit corporate contributions to candidates in state elections.1 
Although the Supreme Court sustained the federal corporate contribution ban as recently as 
2003 in Federal Election Commission v. Beaumont,2 that decision and the corporate contribution bans 
generally today rest on admittedly “shaky ground.”3 As the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit observed, campaign finance law is “in a state of flux (especially with regard to campaign-
finance laws regulating corporations).”4  Over the past decade, the Roberts Court has demonstrated 
little respect for either legislative campaign finance restrictions5 or the Court’s own campaign finance 
precedents.6 In Citizens United v. FEC, the Court disavowed one of the justifications Beaumont relied and 
                                                          
1
 National Conf. of State Legislatures, State Limits on Contributions to Candidates (Oct. 2013). 
2
 FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146 (2003). 
3
 Minnesota Citizens Concerned for Life, Inc. v. Swanson, 692 F.3d 864, 879 n.12 (8
th
 Cir. 2012). 
4
 Green Party of Connecticut v. Garfield, 616 F.3d 189, 199 (2d Cir. 2010). 
5
 See, e.g., McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S.Ct. 1434 (2014) (invalidating federal aggregate contribution limit); Arizona 
Free Enterprise Club’s Free Enterprise PAC v. Bennett, 131 S.Ct. 2806 (2011) (invalidating provision of Arizona 
public funding law); Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (invalidating federal law prohibiting corporate and 
union independent expenditures and electioneering communications); Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724 (2008) 
(invalidating federal “millionaire’s amendment”); Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230 (2006) (invalidating Vermont 
contribution limits). See also FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449 (2007) (sharply restricting scope of 
the federal ban on corporate and union electioneering communications; that ban was subsequently invalidated 
outright in Citizens United).  
6
 See, e.g., McCutcheon, supra (overturning portion of Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) which had sustained 
federal aggregate contribution limit); Citizens United, supra (overturning portions of McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 
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called into question another.7 To be sure, the Citizens United majority stressed that the case concerned 
only a spending ban -- not a contribution restriction -- and invoked the Court’s longstanding practice of 
applying more stringent review of spending rules than of contribution limits.8 But Citizens United’s 
emphatic assertion of the First Amendment rights of corporations9 surely casts a shadow on the 
constitutionality of corporate contribution bans. This year’s decision in McCutcheon v. FEC – which 
subtly ratcheted up the Court’s standard of review of contribution restrictions – darkens that shadow 
still.  If and when the Court decides to hear a constitutional challenge,10 the ban on corporate 
contributions may prove difficult to sustain. 
Nonetheless, assuming the Court continues to recognize the constitutional validity of 
contribution limits and to apply a less strict standard of review of contribution restrictions than 
expenditures – admittedly a big “if” – the ban on corporate donations ought to pass constitutional 
muster. The corporate contribution ban advances two long-recognized public interests that have been 
held to justify contribution restrictions: the protection of the rights of politically dissenting shareholders, 
and the prevention of the evasion of constitutionally valid limits on individual donations to candidates. 
Although Citizens United dismissed the shareholder-protection concern as a support for an expenditure 
ban, shareholder protection is an important interest previously acknowledged by the Court in the 
contribution restriction context, and a contribution ban is closely drawn to protect that interest. 
Shareholder-protection should be able to meet the less restrictive standard for contribution limits. So, 
too, the Court has long accepted the prevention of circumvention of individual-to-candidate 
contribution limits as a constitutionally sufficient justification for other contribution restrictions. In 
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., the Court recognized that a corporation “is simply a form of 
organization used by human beings to achieve desired ends.”11 One of those ends can be making 
campaign contributions. In most states, a person can form a corporation simply by filing a few papers 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
(2003) and Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990) which had sustained prohibitions on 
corporate campaign spending). 
7
 Compare Citizens United, 588 U.S. at 348-56 (rejecting Austin’s “antidistortion” rationale) with Beaumont, 539 
U.S. at 153-54 (citing and quoting Austin).  Compare also Citizens United, 588 U.S. at 361-62 (rejecting shareholder 
protection rationale for corporate spending ban) with Beaumont, 539 U.S. at 154-55 (invoking that rationale). 
8
 Citizens United, 588 U.S. at 345, 356-61. 
9
 See id. at 342-66. 
10
 The Court has now twice declined opportunities to address the issue. See Iowa Right to Life Comm., Inc. v. 
Tooker, 134 U.S. 1787 (2014) (denying petition for certiorari for Eighth Circuit decision that, inter alia, upheld Iowa 
law banning campaign contributions by corporations, insurance companies, savings associations, banks, and credit 
unions); Danielczyk v. United States, 133 S.Ct. 1459 (2013) (denying petition for certiorari for Fourth Circuit 
decision upholding constitutionality of federal corporate contribution ban). 
11
 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., __ U.S. __ (2014) at *13. 
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and paying a nominal fee. A single individual can generate multiple corporations that he or she controls 
and can use to circumvent the legal rules governing campaign finance activities. The use of corporations 
to evade disclosure requirements has become a regular occurrence since Citizens United freed 
corporations to engage in independent spending. If corporations could also make contributions, they 
could easily become a means to avoid the donation limits on the “people (including shareholders, 
officers, and employees) who are closely associated with a corporation in one way or another.”12 
Although McCutcheon tightened the “fit” required between the important public interest a campaign 
finance law is intended to sustain and the restrictions imposed by that law, the corporate contribution 
ban is narrowly tailored, and leaves room for other forms of campaign finance activity for the individuals 
affiliated with the corporation. Nor do there appear to be less restrictive alternatives that can effectively 
achieve the shareholder-protection and anti-circumvention goals. 
In Citizens United and again in McCutcheon, the Court emphasized that the goal of reducing the 
political power of the wealthy cannot justify campaign finance restrictions, and it is surely the case that 
much of the impetus for the corporate contribution is public anxiety over corporate wealth and power. 
But the shareholder-protection and anti-circumvention justifications are not based on an effort to curb 
the role of wealth inequalities in politics. Rather, they reflect other key features of the corporate form – 
its artificial existence as a legal to achieve ends desired by the individuals who have created it, and the 
potential for the interests the control the corporation to exploit dissenting shareholders. These two 
interests work in tandem, with shareholder-protection having greater purchase for multi-shareholder 
publicly-held entities, and anti-circumvention more relevant for single-shareholder, closely-held or 
nonprofit corporations. Together, they make the case for the corporate contribution ban for reasons 
other than the equality-promoting goal that Citizens United and McCutcheon so vehemently rejected. 
This Article explores the current constitutional status of the corporate campaign contribution 
ban.13 Part II provides a brief history of corporate campaign finance restrictions, including an analysis of 
                                                          
12
 Id. 
13
 This article does not address laws prohibiting contributions by labor unions, which has been part of the federal 
campaign finance system since 1943 and are on the books in sixteen states, see Nat’l Conf. of State Legs., supra. 
The two justifications this article relies on to sustain the corporate ban – shareholder-protection and anti-
circumvention of the corruption-preventing limits on individual contributions to candidates -- do not apply to 
unions. As a result of a long string of Supreme Court decisions, dissenting employees (the equivalent of dissenting 
shareholders in the union context) required to pay unions the fees have a right not to have those fees used for 
political purposes and to have their required fee payments reduced accordingly.  By enabling them to opt-out of 
compelled support for political activity, the Supreme Court has already provided objecting employees protection 
from compelled support of political activity. See generally Benjamin I. Sachs, “Unions, Corporations, and Political 
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the Supreme Court’s case law dealing with the campaign finance rules applicable to corporations prior 
to Citizens United. Part III assesses Citizens United, its implications for the prohibition on corporate 
campaign contributions, and its impact on the shareholder protection rationale in the contribution 
setting. Part IV examines the anti-corruption argument in light of McCutcheon more restrictive analysis 
of that justification for campaign finance regulation. Part V concludes. 
II. The Corporate Contribution Ban 
 A. Origins and Statutory Development 
In his Fifth Annual Message to Congress in 1833 President Andrew Jackson hotly denounced the 
campaign spending of the Second Bank of the United States – “this great and powerful institution” 
which, he asserted, “had been actively engaged in attempting to influence the elections of the public 
officers by means of its money” in the 1832 election. In language that would fit right in today’s campaign 
finance debates, Jackson declared “the question is distinctly presented whether the people of the 
United States are to govern through representatives chosen by their unbiased suffrages or whether the 
money and power of a great corporation are to be secretly exerted to influence their judgment and 
control their decisions.”14 Three decades later, Abraham Lincoln also expressed anxiety about corporate 
corruption of the political process. With the Civil War generating enormous profits for government 
contractors, Lincoln wrote: “I see in the near future a crisis approaching that unnerves me and causes 
me to tremble for the safety of my country. . . . [C]orporations have been enthroned and an era of 
corruption in high places will follow, and the money power of the country will endeavor to prolong its 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Opt-Out Rights After Citizens United,” 112 Colum. L. Rev. 800, 811-19 (2012). Nor are unions, unlike corporations 
as discussed in Part IV, plausible vehicles for evasion of the limits on individual contributions. Individual union dues 
or fee payments are generally well below the dollar cap on individual donations, and there seems to be little 
likelihood – or evidence – that a union could be created by a wealthy donor solely to end-run the cap on individual 
donations.  
In addition, this article focus on bans on corporate donations to candidates, political parties, and political 
committees that contribute to candidates. It assumes that, consistent with Citizens United, corporations may not 
be barred from donating to political committees that engage only in independent expenditures. See, e.g.  
Republican Party of New Mexico v. King, 741 F.3d 1089 (10
th
 Cir. 2013); Texans for Free Enterprise v. Texas Ethics 
Comm., 732 F.3d 535 (5
th
 Cir. 2013). 
 
14
 Andrew Jackson, Fifth Annual Message, Dec. 3, 1833. 
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reign by working upon the prejudices of the people until all wealth is aggregated in a few hands and the 
Republic is destroyed.”15  
Despite these early critical comments, corporations became a central focus of campaign finance 
concern only in the late nineteenth century. Civil service reform cut into the ability of candidates and 
parties to finance their campaigns through assessments on government employees, while the 
consolidation of major manufacturers, railroads, banks, and mining and oil companies created large and 
powerful firms with great stakes in government tariff, monetary, infrastructure, public lands 
development, and regulatory policies. In 1886, former President Rutherford B. Hayes, a Republican, 
lamented “this is a government of the people, by the people, and for the people no longer. It is a 
government by the corporations, of the corporations, and for the corporations.”16 Two years later 
President Grover Cleveland, a Democrat, pointed to the “existence of trusts, combinations, and 
monopolies” and warned Congress in his Fourth Annual Message that “corporations, which should be 
the carefully restrained creatures of the law and the servants of the people, are fast becoming the 
people’s masters.”17 As a leading political scientist of the era observed, by 1900, in the funding of the 
political parties “[f]irst and foremost come the representatives of the big industrial or financial 
concerns.”18 
The growing role of corporate campaign money triggered a reaction. In 1891, Kentucky 
amended its constitution to become the first state to ban the use of corporate funds to influence any 
election in the state.19 That provision is still part of the Kentucky Constitution.20 In 1897, following the 
1896 election in which the heavily business-funded Republican Party overwhelmed the Democratic and 
Populist presidential candidacy of William Jennings Bryan, three agrarian states that had supported 
Bryan – Tennessee, Florida, and Nebraska -- banned corporate contributions to candidates and parties.21 
Even some Republicans from the industrial northeast were troubled by the growing role of corporate 
                                                          
15
 Abraham Lincoln, Letter to Col. William F. Elkins, Nov. 21, 1864, quoted and cited in Rick Crawford, What Lincoln 
Foresaw: Corporations “Enthroned” After the Civil War and Re-Writing the Laws Defining their Existence, 
http://www.ratical.org/corporations/Lincoln.html.  
16
 See Jack Beatty, Age of Betrayal: The Triumph of Money in America 1865-1900 (Vintage Books 2008) at xv. 
17
 Grover Cleveland, Fourth Annual Message (first term), December 3, 1888, 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29529.  
18
 M.I. Ostrogorski, Democracy and the Organization of Political Parties, 1902, quoted in Robert E. Mutch, 
Campaigns, Congress, and Courts: The Making of Federal Campaign Finance Law (1988) at 165.  
19
 See Adam Winkler, Other People’s Money: Corporations, Agency Costs, and Campaign Finance Law, 92 Geo. L.J. 
871, 883 (2004). 
20
 Kentucky Const., § 150. 
21
 Perry Belmont, Publicity of Election Expenditures, 180 No. Am. Rev. 166, 176 (1905). 
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money in politics. At New York’s 1894 state constitutional convention, corporate lawyer Elihu Root 
(subsequently William McKinley’s and Theodore Roosevelt’s secretary of war and Roosevelt’s secretary 
of state) led an unsuccessful effort to insert a corporate contribution ban into the state constitution. In 
1901, William E. Chandler, a Republican senator from New Hampshire and a former Republican National 
Committee chairman, introduced the first federal bill to keep corporations out of congressional election 
campaigns. 
Public attention to corporate campaign money mounted during the 1904 presidential election. 
More than a million dollars – or about $25 million in 2014 dollars – quietly flowed into Theodore 
Roosevelt’s campaign from J.P. Morgan, Henry Clay Frick, and senior executives at Standard Oil, the New 
York Central Railroad, and major insurance companies.22 Following up on earlier – and at-that-time 
inaccurate – allegations by Joseph Pulitzer in the New York World that the major trusts were making 
large contributions to Roosevelt to head off investigations by the recently-created federal Bureau of 
Corporations, Democratic candidate Alton Parker made a major campaign address in which he claimed 
that “debasing and corrupt” payments had been made to the GOP by “individuals of corporations . . . 
who would control the results of election contests.”23 His integrity as a trust-buster challenged, 
Roosevelt responded by denying that any business contributions he had received involved corrupt 
dealings and pointed to the “great corporate interests” that were financing his opponent.24   
The following year, the New York Legislative Investigating Committee (the “Armstrong 
Committee”) revealed in public hearings that New York’s three major life insurance companies – the 
Equitable, New York Life, and Mutual Life – had contributed hundreds of thousands of dollars to the 
national Republican Party and Republican officeholders in the 1896, 1900, and 1904 elections. This 
“caused a profound sensation as it furnished the first tangible evidence of connections between the 
insurance company and a political party,”25 and was seen as confirming the allegations Parker had 
hurled at Roosevelt the year before. In response, Roosevelt in his 1905 Annual Message to Congress 
pointed to the “corruption of the flagrant kind which has been exposed,” and urged that “[a]ll 
contributions by corporations to any political committee or for any political purpose should be 
                                                          
22
 Edmund Morris, Theodore Rex 356-60 (2001). 
23
 Id. at 361. 
24
 Id. at 363.  
25
 Mutch, supra, at 2 (quoting the Sept. 16, 1905 New York Herald Tribune). As Mutch explains, the big insurance 
companies loomed much larger in the national economy in 1905 than they do today. In 1903, the three insurers 
“together took in more money than the entire internal revenue receipts of the federal government.” Robert E. 
Mutch, Before and After Bellotti: The Corporate Political Contributions Cases, 5 Elec. L.J. 293, 295 n. 5 (2006). 
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forbidden by law.”26 Senator Benjamin R. “Pitchfork Ben” Tillman, a South Carolina Democrat, 
introduced a bill to implement Roosevelt’s proposal as part of a broader, partisan effort to investigate 
corporate contributions in the three prior national elections. The Republican-led Senate quickly passed 
the bill without debate, avoiding the potentially embarrassing investigation Tillman had sought, but the 
measure died in the House.27 Roosevelt repeated his call for a corporate contribution ban in his 1906 
Annual Message; it was the very first item on his agenda.28 When the House reconvened for its short 
lame-duck session in January 1907, it quickly passed Tillman’s bill, which prohibited federally-chartered 
corporations from making contributions in any election, and prohibited all corporations from making 
contributions in federal elections.  
Campaign finance law’s early and intensive focus on corporations reflected two concerns. First, 
there was a sharp and growing anxiety about corporate influence over government. As Elihu Root 
argued to the 1894 New York Constitutional Convention, “great moneyed interests” “are exerting yearly 
more and more undue influence in political affairs.” A corporate contribution ban would “prevent the 
great moneyed corporations of the country from furnishing the money with which to elect members of 
the legislature of this state, in order that those members may vote to protect the corporations.  It is to 
prevent the great railroad companies, the great insurance companies, the great telephone companies, 
the great aggregations of wealth from using corporate funds, directly or indirectly, to send members of 
the legislature to these halls, in order to vote for their protection and the advancement of their interest 
as against those of the public.”29 As Root explained, corporate campaign contributions put the political 
parties in their debt, “a debt to be recognized and repaid with the votes of representatives in the 
legislature and in Congress or by the actions of administrative and executive officers who have been 
elected in large measure through the use of money so contributed.”30 In its report to the New York state 
legislature, the Armstrong Committee made the same point: 
“The testimony taken by the Committee makes it abundantly clear that the large insurance 
companies systematically attempted to control legislation in this and other states. . . . It is 
apparent that contributions . . . . for use in State Campaigns were made with the idea that they 
would be protected in matters of legislation. Senator Platt, to whom the contributions were 
made, testified that it was supposed that an advantage would be derived through his relation to 
                                                          
26
 Theodore Roosevelt, Fifth Annual Message, December 5, 1905. 
27
 Mutch, Campaigns, Congress and Courts, supra, at 5-7. 
28
 Theodore Roosevelt, Sixth Annual Message, December 3, 1906. 
29
 Elihu Root, “The Political Uses of Money,” in E. Root, Addresses on Government and Citizenship (collected and 
edited by Robert Bacon and James Brown Scott, 1916, reprinted 1969). 
30
 Id.  
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the [Republican] State Committee . . . ; in short, that the use of the contributed moneys in the 
election of candidates to office would place them under more or less of an implied obligation 
not to attack the interests supporting them.”31 
Controlling corporate campaign contributions was part of a broader program of addressing corporate 
power. Theodore Roosevelt combined his call for a ban on corporate campaign contributions with other 
proposals for the “adequate regulation and supervision of the great corporations.” 
Second, there was evidence that corporate executives were misusing shareholder funds to 
advance their own interests – what has come to be known as the “other people’s money” problem. The 
Armstrong Committee found that insurance company contributions were often inconsistent with the 
partisan preferences of policyholders, as “executive officers have sought to impose their political views 
upon a constituency of divergent convictions.”32 Sometimes the contributions were actually used to 
advance goals adverse to shareholder interests. The Committee noted that the big insurance companies 
were making large contributions at a time when the legislature was considering legislation that would 
affect the ability of policyholders to sue insurance companies for breach for fiduciary duty. In other 
words, the leaders of these companies were using policyholder funds to secure legislative protection for 
themselves against their own policyholders.33  
Following the Teapot Dome scandal of the early 1920s, the Tillman Act was strengthened by the 
Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925 which broadened the contribution ban from money donations to 
include “anything of value,” thereby picking up corporate loans, in-kind assistance, and the use of 
corporate facilities. In the 1940s, a similar ban was imposed on labor union contributions in federal 
elections, and in the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 the contribution ban was expanded to include a 
prohibition on campaign expenditures by both corporations and unions. Unions responded to the 
restrictions on their campaign activities with the innovation of the political action committee (“PAC”) – a 
formally separate, albeit affiliated, entity with its own officers and funds provided by nominally 
voluntary contributions by union members.  
                                                          
31
 Testimony Taken Before the Joint Committee of the Senate and Assembly of the State of New York to Investigate 
and Examine into the Business and Affairs of Life  Insurance Companies Doing Business in the State of New York 
(Armstrong Committee) 1905, at p. 2916, quoted in Sikes, supra, at 109-10. 
32
 Sikes, supra, at 10.  
33
 Winkler, supra, at 895-96.  
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The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (“FECA”)34 was primarily focused on individual 
contributions and the campaign practices of candidates, parties, and political committees but it clarified 
the legality of the PAC device and authorized certain corporate and union campaign finance activities. 
The 1971 Act, along with amendments in 1974 and 1976, confirmed that a corporation or union could 
set up a “separate, segregated fund” – that is, a PAC – which could solicit donations (subject to 
monetary limits) from individuals affiliated with the corporation or union and use those funds to 
contribute to, or spend money supporting or opposing, federal candidates.35 The Bipartisan Campaign 
Reform Act of 2002 (“BCRA” or “McCain-Feingold”) subsequently extended the reach of the corporate 
and union expenditure ban and expanded the corporate and union contribution prohibition to include 
all donations to the national political parties and all donations to state parties used to finance a defined 
set of federal election activities.  
B. The Corporate Campaign Finance Restrictions in the Courts 
(1) The Early Years: Early twentieth century courts had little difficulty upholding the special 
restrictions on corporations. Corporations were seen as artificial creatures with powers limited to the 
business purposes spelled out in their charters,36 and corporate money was seen as presenting a 
particular danger of “corrupting the elector and debauching the election.”37 Before the 1940s the First 
Amendment played little role in the judicial assessment of campaign finance restrictions. Even when 
free speech concerns were considered, limits on corporate money were not a problem because, in the 
words of one state supreme court, “[t]he individual activities of the officers of the corporation are not 
                                                          
34
 Before FECA, President Kennedy’s President’s Commission on Campaign Costs, which recommended many 
changes to federal campaign finance law, include the abolition of the ceilings on individual contributions and on 
total expenditures by political committees called for the retention and strict enforcement of the prohibitions on 
corporate and union contributions and expenditures. See Financing Presidential Campaigns, Report of the 
President’s Commission on Campaign Costs (1962). 
35
 The parent organization could use its own funds – known as “treasury funds” – to pay the costs of 
administering the PAC and of raising funds for it; select the PAC’s personnel; and set the PAC’s 
contribution and expenditure activity. FECA exempted from restriction the expenditure of corporate or union 
treasury funds on “internal communications,” that is “communications by a corporation to its stockholders and 
executive or administrative personnel and their families or by a labor organization to its members and their 
families on any subject.” 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(2)(A). This essentially codified the decision in United States v. CIO, 335 
U.S. 106 (1948), interpreting the 1947 campaign expenditure not to apply to such communications. The law further 
provided that nonpartisan registration and get-out-the-vote campaigns by a corporation aimed at its stockholders 
and executive and administrative personnel and their families, or by a labor organization aimed at its members and 
their families, would not be treated as forbidden contributions or expenditures. 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(2)(B). 
36
 See, e.g., People v. Gansley, 158 N.W. 195 (Mich. 1916); People ex rel Perkins v. Moss, 187 N.Y. 410 (1907); 
McConnell v. Combination Mining & Milling, 76 P.2d 194 (Mont. 1904).  
37
 United States v. United States Brewers’ Ass’n, 239 F. 163, 168-69 (W.D. Pa. 1916). 
10 
 
prohibited. They may freely speak, write, and publish their views.”38 The few constitutional challenges to 
the federal restrictions on corporations were rejected. The Tillman Act barring corporate campaign 
contributions in federal elections was upheld by a federal district court in 1916 as a measure preventing 
“undue influence” and “preserving the freedom of the voter and the purity of the ballot.”39  
The Supreme Court did not directly address the restrictions on corporate campaign activity 
before Buckley v. Valeo40 ushered in the modern era of campaign finance jurisprudence, but in one 
important pre-Buckley decision dealing with the Taft-Hartley Act’s prohibition of union campaign 
expenditures the Court demonstrated considerable sympathy for the view that corporate financial 
power poses a threat to democratic elections. In United States v. Auto Workers,41 the Court considered 
the indictment of a union for spending treasury funds on television ads endorsing candidates in a 
congressional election. The district court had held that the union’s spending fell within an exemption to 
the spending ban;42 the Supreme Court reversed, holding the ads fell squarely within the statute, and 
reinstated the indictment.43 Without resolving the question of whether the spending ban was 
constitutional, Justice Frankfurter’s opinion for the Court provided a lengthy, sympathetic, and detailed 
account44 -- dating back to the post-Civil War era and quoting from Elihu Root’s address to the 1894 New 
York Constitutional Convention45 -- of public concern about the concentration of wealth, the “felt threat 
to economic freedom created by enormous industrial combines,” and the decades-long efforts by state 
and federal governments to control first corporate and then union money in electoral politics. In his 
words, these measures were intended to protect “the integrity of our electoral process, and, not less, 
the responsibility of the individual citizen for the successful functioning of that process.”46 The Taft-
Hartley restrictions were the culmination of a “long series of congressional efforts calculated to avoid 
the deleterious influences on federal elections resulting from the use of money by those who exercise 
control over large aggregations of capital.”47 The law was intended “to protect the political process from 
                                                          
38
 Gansley, supra, 158 N.W. at 201. 
39
 United States Brewers’ Ass’n, supra, 239 F. at 168-69. 
40
 424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
41
 352 U.S. 567 (1957). 
42
 In an earlier decision, the Supreme Court had held that the spending prohibition did not apply to 
communications by a union to its own members and their families. United States v CIO, 335 U.S. 106 (1948). The 
district court had held that the Auto Workers spending fell within the CIO exemption. 
43
 Id. at 588-89. 
44
 Id. at 570-84. 
45
 Id. at 570-71 
46
 Id. at 570.  
47
 Id. at 585. 
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what it [Congress] deemed to be the corroding effect of money employed in elections by aggregated 
power.”48  
(2) Bellotti: In 1976, Buckley v. Valeo laid the foundation of modern campaign finance 
jurisprudence by finding that campaign finance restrictions implicate the freedoms of speech and 
association protected by the First Amendment.49 The Court applied strict judicial scrutiny to expenditure 
limits, but found that contribution restrictions may be sustained “if the State demonstrates a sufficiently 
important interest and employs means closely drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgment of associational 
freedoms.”50 It then held that “the prevention of corruption and the appearance of corruption spawned 
by the real or imagined coercive influence of large financial contributions on candidates’ positions and 
on their actions if elected to office” is a sufficiently important interest to justify contribution 
limitations.51 Buckley did not address the special restrictions on corporate contributions and 
expenditures, but two years later, in First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti,52 the Court decided a 
corporate campaign finance case. Bellotti held that the First Amendment applies to restrictions on 
corporate campaign activity, and it invalidated a provision of the Massachusetts constitution barring a 
corporation from spending concerning a ballot measure that did not materially affect its business, 
property, or assets.  
Writing for the majority, Justice Powell determined that even though a corporation lacks a 
natural person’s “interest in self-expression,”53 its electioneering is valuable because of the central role 
election-related speech plays in informing “democratic decision-making.” Moreover, the “inherent 
worth of the speech in terms of its capacity for informing the public does not depend upon the identity 
                                                          
48
 Id. at 582. Despite the glowing words, the Court determined that it was premature to resolve the constitutional 
question as the case had not actually been tried. Id. at 589-92. On remand, the jury returned a verdict of not guilty, 
and the case did not return to the Supreme Court. Three justices, in an opinion by Justice Douglas would have 
invalidated the statute under the First Amendment. See id. at 593-98. One pre-Buckley court of appeals case 
directly addressed and sustained the federal prohibition of corporate campaign spending. See United States v. 
Lewis Food Co., 366 F.2d 710, 712-13 (9
th
 Cir. 1966) (noting the “necessity for destroying the influence over 
elections which corporations exercised through financial contributions”). 
Only one pre-Buckley Supreme Court case dealt directly with corporate campaign activity.  In Cort v. Ash, 
422 U.S. 66 (1975), the Court held that Taft-Hartley did not endow shareholders with a private right of action to 
sue their corporation for illegal corporate campaign finance activities. Cort turned on the standards for implying 
private rights of action and the significance of Congress’s creation of the Federal Election Commission to enforce 
federal election law rather than the constitutionality of the restrictions on corporations. 
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of the source, whether corporation, association, union or individual.”54 Corporate campaign speech is 
constitutionally protected not because of the corporation’s interest in being able to speak in order to 
advance its self-interest -- which was taken care by the exception from the spending ban for ballot 
propositions affecting corporate business, property, or assets -- but because of the societal interest in 
voters being able to hear information and ideas relevant to the election. Following Buckley’s 
determination that strict judicial scrutiny must be applied to expenditure restrictions, the Court 
considered the two justifications the state asserted to justify its restriction: (i) “sustaining the active role 
of the individual citizen in the electoral process and thereby preventing diminution of the citizen’s 
confidence in government,” and (ii) protecting the rights of dissenting shareholders.  
The Court agreed that the first justification was an interest “of the highest importance.” The 
state’s argument that campaign spending by “wealthy and powerful corporations” can “drown out other 
points of view” and thereby undermine active citizen participation and public confidence in government 
would deemed worthy of consideration, but only if there were “record or legislative findings that 
corporate advocacy imminently threatened to undermine democratic processes.”55 The Court found 
there had been “no showing that the relative voice of corporations has been overwhelming or even 
significant in influencing referenda in Massachusetts” or posed any threat to public confidence in 
government.56 More significantly, the majority expressed some doubt that such a negative consequence 
from corporate campaign spending could ever be shown. The Court then reframed the state’s argument 
into Buckley’s concern with the quid pro quo corruption of campaign money on officeholders. It 
concluded that such a quid pro quo could not arise in a ballot proposition election because the spending 
did not concern a candidate who could be “corrupted.”   
The state’s asserted interest in protecting the interests of dissenting shareholders received 
relatively short shrift. Shareholder protection was deemed to be “an interest that is both legitimate and 
traditionally within the province of state law,” but banning corporate spending in elections was held to 
be both overinclusive and underinclusive. It was overinclusive because it would apply even if the 
spending received unanimous shareholder approval, and it was underinclusive because it targeted 
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corporate campaign spending but not corporate lobbying, and only corporations and not other 
organizations, such as business trusts or unions.57 
(3) NRWC, MCFL, and Austin. The four dissenters in Bellotti concluded that the case cast 
“considerable” doubt on all federal and state restrictions on corporate campaign finance activity.58 Yet, 
those restrictions proved surprisingly resilient. Just four years after Bellotti, a unanimous Supreme 
Court, in an opinion by Justice Rehnquist, upheld the FECA provision restricting the ability of a 
corporation to solicit contributions for its federal election PAC. The case involved the National Right to 
Work Committee (“NWRC”) a nonstock, nonprofit, ideological, anti-union corporation. FECA provides 
that a corporation may solicit contributions for its PAC only from executive and administrative personnel 
and shareholders; a nonstock corporation that has no shareholders may solicit its “members” but not 
the general public. NRWC did not have formal members but claimed that individuals affiliated with the 
organization by contributing to it, so that a contributor became a member for the purpose of future 
solicitations. In FEC v. NRWC,59 the Supreme Court rejected NRWC’s statutory interpretation of 
“member” -- thereby constraining the ability of the organization to raise campaign funds -- and then 
upheld the constitutionality of the solicitation restriction. The Court found that two government 
interests justified the corporate restriction: (i) ensuring that “substantial aggregations of wealth 
amassed by the special advantages of the corporate form . . . should not be converted into political ‘war 
chests’ which could be used to incur political debts from legislators who are aided by contributions,” and 
(ii) protecting the “individuals who have paid money into a corporation or union for purposes other than 
the support of candidates from having their money used to support political candidates to whom they 
may be opposed.” Strikingly, the Court applied the general arguments for special restrictions on 
corporations to an entity totally unlike the paradigmatic powerful business corporation that had long 
been the inspiration for the special restrictions on corporations.  The NRWC PAC had collected just 
$77,000 in the first year it claimed that its donors should be treated as members, which was hardly a 
“substantial aggregation of wealth.” As a non-stock ideological organization, its putative members were 
voluntary donors who presumably had contributed to the PAC because they generally supported the 
organization’s political views, not for unrelated investment purposes. But instead of closely examining 
the applicability of the general restrictions on corporations to the organization at hand, the Court 
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expressed its willingness to honor the “legislative judgment” that it was the “special characteristics of 
the corporate structure” not the wealth resulting from the corporate form or the use of the corporation 
as an investment device that “require particularly careful regulation.”60 Tracing the development of the 
corporate and union restrictions from the Tillman Act and the Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925, 
through Taft-Hartley, FECA and its amendments, the Court concluded that this history of “careful 
legislative adjustment of the federal electoral laws . . . to account for the particular legal and economic 
attributes or corporations and labor organizations warrants considerable deference.”61 The Court 
declined to “second-guess a legislative judgment as to the need for prophylactic measures where 
corruption is the evil feared.”62 
Bellotti and NRWC were technically reconcilable – the latter involved contributions and 
candidate elections while the former dealt with expenditures and a ballot proposition election – but the 
tenor and reasoning were totally different, with NRWC drawing on the pre-Buckley era’s focus on 
corporate wealth and the misuse of “other people’s money.” Four years later, in FEC v. Massachusetts 
Citizens for Life, Inc. (“MCFL”),63 the Court avoided choosing between the two approaches. MCFL, a 
nonprofit, nonstock corporation organized to engage in educational and political activities in support of 
the “right-to-life” cause, used its treasury funds to send voters literature presenting the voting records 
of federal and state candidates from a “pro-life” perspective. The FEC contended these campaign 
expenditures should have been funded by MCFL’s PAC, not the corporation’s treasury funds. The 
Supreme Court held that the First Amendment required the exclusion of campaign spending by 
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ideological non-profit corporations like MCFL from the general corporate spending ban, but did so in an 
opinion implying that the application of the ban to business corporations would be valid. 64   
Justice Brennan’s opinion for the Court found that corporate campaign spending poses the 
danger of “the corrosive influence of concentrated corporate wealth” on the “integrity of the 
marketplace of political ideas.” Justice Brennan emphasized that corporate resources are “not an 
indication of popular support for the corporation’s political ideas but instead reflect nothing more than 
the “economically motivated decisions of investors and customers. The availability of these resources 
may make a corporation a formidable political presence, even though the power of the corporation may 
be no reflection of the power of its ideas.”65  But MCFL’s spending did not raise these concerns. The 
organization was formed for a political, not an economic purpose; it did not engage in business activities 
or amass capital in the economic marketplace; and the donations it received necessarily reflected the 
donors’ support for its political views. It did not accept contributions from business corporations, so it 
could not serve as a conduit for proscribed corporate expenditures. Moreover, donors had no economic 
stake in the organization which might discourage them from disassociating from it if they disagreed with 
its electioneering. Although corporate in form, MCFL was really a political association and not the kind of 
business that comes to mind when the term “corporation” is used. As a result, the First Amendment 
required that MCFL and comparable ideological entities be exempted from the spending ban. But the 
theory of the MCFL exemption supported application of the ban to business corporations that fit the 
spirit of the restriction. Four justices, in an opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, dissented, finding the ban 
should even have been applied to MCFL. They contended that, as in NRWC, the Court should defer to 
Congress’s judgment that spending enabled by the corporate form inherently threatens the political 
process. The dissenters also stressed that given the availability of the PAC mechanism the law did not 
really “ban” corporate spending as much as it required that spending be channeled through a corporate 
PAC so the Court need not “consider the validity of a direct and absolute limitation on independent 
expenditures by corporations.”66 
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Four years later, in 1990, in Austin v. Michigan State Chamber of Commerce,67 the Court applied 
MCFL’s logic and expressly upheld the constitutionality of a state prohibition on the spending of 
corporate treasury funds in candidate elections. In an opinion by Justice Marshall for six justices, the 
Court agreed with Bellotti that restrictions on corporate campaign spending are subject to the First 
Amendment,68 but found that corporate spending presents distinct dangers that justify its prohibition. 
Echoing MCFL and NRWC, Austin emphasized the state-createdness of corporations, the state grant of 
“special advantages” to corporations which give them the opportunity to amass great wealth, and the 
lack of any necessary connection between the resources corporations have for electoral activity and 
public support for their political ideas. Austin couched this in terms of preventing corruption. Buckley 
had discussed corruption as the quid pro quo between a donor and the candidate/elected official-
recipient, but Austin held that such “‘financial quid pro quo’ corruption” is not the only kind of 
corruption that can justify campaign finance restrictions.  Michigan’s law addressed another type of 
corruption: “the corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth that are 
accumulated with the help of the corporate form and that have little or no correlation to the public’s 
support for the corporation’s political ideas.”69 That “antidistortion” argument sounds a lot like the 
egalitarian justification for limiting spending that Buckley rejected,70 but Austin insisted that the law 
addressed corruption, not political inequality. The problem with corporate spending was not that 
corporations might spend more than other political actors – that is, spending inequality -- but distortion 
– that a corporation’s resources for campaign spending reflects its economic success but has “little or no 
correlation to the public’s support for the corporation’s political ideas.”71   Unequal spending was all 
right if it reflected differences in the extent of support for different spenders’ political positions, but not 
when based on wealth differences unconnected to political belief. Justice Brennan’s concurring opinion 
emphasized the dissenting-shareholder-protection justification. Noting that most members who joined 
the Michigan Chamber of Commerce did so for economic and not political reasons, he determined “the 
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State surely has a compelling interest in preventing a corporation it has chartered from exploiting those 
who do not wish to contribute to the Chamber’s political message.”72  
Austin not only found anti-distortion to be a compelling justification but  determined that the 
spending restriction was narrowly tailored to accomplish that end. According to the Court, the 
restriction was not an absolute ban on spending but merely a requirement that the corporation use a 
PAC – which Michigan, unlike the Massachusetts restriction at issue in Bellotti, allowed. Moreover, 
where Bellotti had imposed very tight “tailoring” requirements and was quick to fault the Massachusetts 
law for over- and under-inclusiveness, Austin was more forgiving. The law’s application to closely held 
corporations without great reserves of capital was not a problem. As in NRWC, the Court emphasized 
the need to defer to the legislative judgment that it is the “potential for distortion” inherent in the 
capacity for the corporate form to facilitate the accumulation of great wealth that justifies regulation. 
Nor was the law’s exclusion of unincorporated associations and unions from the spending ban a 
constitutional difficulty. Unincorporated groups might wield power and wealth but they did not benefit 
from the “advantages unique to the corporate form.”73 Union campaign funds were a more accurate 
reflection of employee support for union political activities than a corporation’s general treasury funds 
because the law gave employees the right not to have their union dues used for political purposes if 
they objected.74 
Taken together, NRWC, MCFL and Austin strongly validated the special restrictions on 
corporations, notwithstanding Buckley and Bellotti. Although the First Amendment applied, the state-
created advantages associated with the corporate form and the protection of minority shareholders 
provided compelling justifications for requiring corporations to channel their contributions and spending 
through PACs.  Bellotti was shunted aside as a ballot propositions case of little relevance to candidate 
elections.  
(4) Beaumont: In 2003 in FEC v. Beaumont,75 the Court rejected an effort to create an MCFL-type 
exemption from the corporate contribution ban for a nonprofit corporation, North Carolina Right to Life, 
Inc. (“NCRL”), and strongly affirmed the constitutionality of the corporate contribution prohibition. 
Although NCRL’s resources – like MCFL’s -- presumably reflected the extent of public support for its 
                                                          
72
 Id. at 675. 
73
 Id. at 665.  
74
 Id. at 666. So, too, the law’s exemption of news and editorial expenditures was justified by the media’s “unique 
societal role” in promoting public education, information, discussion, and debate. Id. at 666-68. 
75
 539 U.S. 146 (2003). 
18 
 
ideological activities and not its success in the economic marketplace -- the Court was unwilling to 
disturb “a congressional judgment that has remained essentially unchanged throughout a century” that 
all corporate treasury fund contributions should be excluded from federal elections. Citing NRWC, MCFL, 
and Austin, Beaumont invoked “the ‘special characteristics of the corporate structure’ that threaten the 
integrity of the political process.”76 Beaumont found that “[i]n barring corporate earnings from 
conversion into political ‘war chests,’” the corporate spending ban “was and is intended to ‘preven[t] 
corruption or the appearance of corruption”77 -- the government interests that have been the basis for 
the constitutionality of restrictions on contributions since Buckley. Beaumont credited the shareholder-
protection rationale: “[T]he ban has always done further duty in protecting ‘the individuals who have 
paid money into a corporation or union for purposes other than the support of candidates from having 
that money used to support political candidates to whom they may be opposed.’”78 Beaumont also gave 
great weight to the value of the corporate contribution ban in preventing evasion of the limits on 
individual contributions: 
“Quite aside from war-chest corruption and the interests of contributors and owners, however, 
another reason for regulating corporate electoral involvement has emerged with restrictions on 
individual contributions. . . . To the degree that a corporation could contribute to political 
candidates, the individuals ‘who created it, who own it, or whom it employs,’ . . . could exceed 
the bounds imposed on their own contributions by diverting money through the corporation. . . 
. . [E]xperience ‘demonstrates how candidates, donors, and parties test the limits of the current 
law, and it shows beyond serious doubt how contribution limits would be eroded if inducement 
to circumvent them were enhanced.’”79  
Anti-circumvention, thus, joined prevention of corruption and appearance of corruption, anti-distortion 
and dissenting-shareholder-protection as justifications for the ban on corporate contributions. The anti-
circumvention argument was given special prominence in Beaumont’s justification of the application of 
the ban to a nonprofit like NCRL. As the Court observed “[n]onprofit advocacy corporations are, 
moreover, no less susceptible than traditional business companies to misuse as conducts for 
circumventing the contribution limits imposed on individuals.”80  
 Beaumont also applied Buckley’s more deferential standard of review for contribution 
restrictions to a law that banned – and did not merely impose a dollar limit – on corporate donations. As 
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the Court explained, “[g]oing back to Buckley v. Valeo . . . restrictions on political contributions have 
been treated as merely ‘marginal’ speech restrictions subject to relatively complaisant review under the 
First Amendment, because contributions lie closer to the edges than the core of political expression.”81 
As a result, whereas expenditure restrictions have to be “narrowly tailored to serve a compelling 
governmental interest, ‘a contribution limit involving ‘significant interference’ with associational rights’ 
passes muster if it satisfies the lesser demand of being ‘’closely drawn’ to match a ‘sufficiently important 
interest.’’”82 The question for the Court was whether the ban was closely drawn to the interests 
supporting the restriction on corporate contribution. At that point, the Court, as in Austin, rejected the 
characterization of the prohibition of the contribution of treasury funds as a “ban”: 
“NCRL is simply wrong in characterizing § 441b as a complete ban. As we have said before, the 
section ‘permits some participation of unions and corporations in the federal electoral process 
by allowing them to establish and pay the administrative expenses of [PACs]. . . . The PAC option 
allows corporate political participation without the temptation to use corporate funds for 
political influence, quite possibly at odds with the sentiments if some shareholders or members, 
and it lets the Government regulate campaign activity through registration and disclosure . . . 
without jeopardizing the associational rights of advocacy organizations’ members.”83 
Beaumont noted that “a unanimous Court in National Right to Work did not think the regulatory 
burdens on PACs, including restrictions on their ability to solicit funds, rendered a PAC unconstitutional 
as an advocacy corporation’s sole avenue for making political contributions.”84 Consequently limiting 
corporations to making contributions only through their PACs did not unduly burden their speech and 
associational rights. 
A few months after Beaumont, the Court in McConnell v FEC85 upheld BCRA’s extension of the 
federal prohibition on the use of corporate and union treasury funds for independent expenditures to 
“electioneering communications” – broadcast ads aired during a defined preelection period that refer to 
a candidate by name but do not use the “magic words” of “express advocacy.” In so doing the Court 
recapitulated the history of the special limits on corporations and unions -- from Elihu Root’s 1894 
speech and Theodore Roosevelt’s 1905 Annual Message, through the Tillman Act, the 1925 Federal 
Corrupt Practices Act, Taft-Hartley, Justice Frankfurter’s opinion in Auto Workers, and the enactment of 
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FECA86 -- and then cited its more recent decisions as support for the proposition that Buckley had done 
nothing to undermine the longstanding special treatment of corporations and unions. “Since our 
decision in Buckley, Congress’s powers to prohibit corporations and unions from using funds in their 
treasuries to finance advertisements expressly advocating the election or defeat of candidates has been 
firmly embedded in our law.”87 The Court reiterated its position that the PAC option means it is “’simply 
wrong’ to view the provision as a ‘complete ban’ on expression rather than a regulation.”  The “ability to 
form and administer” PACs “has provided corporations and unions with a constitutionally sufficient 
opportunity to engage in express advocacy.”88 Following hard upon the heels of Beaumont, McConnell 
was the post-Buckley Court’s strongest endorsement of legislative authority to restrict corporate 
campaign activity. But with a 5-4 division and intense dissents, the ruling was a fragile one. Indeed, 
McConnell quickly proved to be the high water mark for the Court’s support for public power to regulate 
corporate campaign finance activity. Following Justice O’Connor’s retirement and her replacement by 
Justice Alito,89 the doctrinal wheel began to turn,90 and in 2010 in Citizens United the new majority 
adopted a sharply different approach.  
III. Citizens United  
A. Corporate Campaign Expenditures 
In Citizens United v. FEC,91 the Supreme Court struck down BCRA’s prohibition on corporate and 
union electioneering communications and the underlying Taft-Hartley ban on corporate and union 
independent spending. In so doing, it overturned the relevant portions of both McConnell and Austin, 
and sharply shifted the Court’s stance on such basic issues as whether corporation campaign 
participation poses a special threat to the political process, and the relevance of the PAC option to the 
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assessment of restrictions on corporate spending. Although the Court took pains to emphasize that it 
was addressing only a law limiting expenditures, the case plainly has implications for the special 
restrictions on corporate campaign contributions. 
Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the majority found that corporate campaign expenditures, like 
other forms of political spending, are protected by the First Amendment. Invoking Bellotti, he 
emphasized that corporations, like individuals, can contribute to political discussion and debate.92 He 
also stressed that the ban on the expenditure of corporate treasury funds really is “a ban on corporate 
speech notwithstanding that a PAC created by a corporation can still speak.”93 Breaking with Austin and 
McConnell he dismissed the relevance of the PAC option because a “PAC is a separate association from 
the corporation” and PACs are subject to “burdensome” organizational, reporting, and record-keeping 
requirements.94  The Court then applied strict judicial scrutiny to the corporate spending ban and 
considered three possible justifications for it: (i) Austin’s “distortion” corruption; (ii) the protection of  
dissenting shareholders; and (iii) prevention of quid pro quo corruption and its appearance.    
Justice Kennedy flatly rejected the idea that any electoral advantage corporations might enjoy 
from their state-created advantages to amass resources in the economic marketplace provides any basis 
for restricting their campaign spending. He also dismissed the relevance of the concern at the heart of 
Austin’s antidistortion rationale that corporate political funds may have little or no correlation with the 
extent of public support for a corporation’s political ideas.95 Citizens United also found the dissenting-
shareholder-protection argument could not sustain the spending ban. Tracking Bellotti, the Court found 
the ban to be overinclusive – it applied to nonprofit corporations and for-profit corporations with only 
single shareholders where there could be not dissents – and underinclusive, applying only to certain 
forms of corporate election spending and not others.96 Moreover, the Court observed “[t]here is little 
evidence of abuse that cannot be corrected by shareholders ‘through the procedures of corporate 
democracy.’”97 Finally, although recognizing that prevention of corruption and the appearance of 
corruption are “sufficiently important” interests to justify limits on contributions, the Court emphasized 
the point it had first made in Buckley that those concerns could not support spending limits.98 The Court 
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stressed the longstanding doctrinal distinction between contributions and expenditures when it 
dismissed the precedential significance of NRWC. As Justice Kennedy acknowledged, “the Court in 
NRWC did say there is a ‘sufficient’ governmental interest in ‘ensur[ing] that substantial aggregations of 
wealth amassed’ by corporations would not ‘be used to incur political debts from legislators who were 
aided by the contributions,”99 but he went on to explain that “NRWC, however, has little relevance here. 
. . . NRWC . . . involved contribution limits . . . which, unlike limits on independent expenditures, have 
been an accepted means to prevent quid pro quo corruption.”100 
 Citizens United rejected the longstanding anxiety in campaign finance law about the power of 
corporate wealth to distort election outcomes and public policy that provided a conceptual foundation 
for Austin and McConnell. The survival of the corporate spending limits for nearly two generations after 
Buckley is testimony to the continuing power of this older idea in our campaign finance thinking. But  
Citizens United demonstrates that the Roberts Court is more determined than ever to limit the scope of 
campaign finance law and, especially, to reject equality as a justification for regulation. Nonetheless, the 
Court’s continued adherence to the contribution/expenditure distinction and to the prevention of 
corruption and its appearance as justifications for campaign finance regulation provide some basis for 
thinking that the ban on corporate contributions may still be constitutional. 
B. Citizens United and the Corporate Contribution Ban 
As the Citizens United Court observed, Citizens United – the plaintiff – “has not made direct 
contributions to candidates”101 and did not challenge the federal corporate contribution ban. That 
constitutional challenge has since been mounted but,  with the prominent exception of one district 
court decision soon overturned by an appellate panel,102 it has been repeatedly rejected, including by 
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the Second, Fourth, Eighth and Ninth Circuit courts of appeals.103 In so doing, these courts have relied on 
two points. 
First, Beaumont remains the governing precedent. Citizens United “did not discuss Beaumont 
and explicitly declined to address the constitutionality of the ban on direct contributions.”104 Even if 
Citizens United’s rejection of the antidistortion and shareholder protection justifications for prohibiting 
corporate treasury fund spending calls into question some of the rationales invoked by the Beaumont 
Court, the rule articulated in Agostini v. Felton105 requires that lower courts must follow governing 
Supreme Court precedent: “[I]f precedent of this Court has direct application in a case, yet appears to 
rest on reasons rejected in some other line of decisions, the Court of Appeals should follow the case 
which directly controls, leaving to this Court the prerogative of overruling its own decisions.”106  
Second, as several of these courts emphasized, Citizens United not only formally left Beaumont 
undisturbed, it also acknowledged the more deferential standard of review traditionally applied to 
contribution restrictions since Buckley v Valeo, and did nothing to question the anti-corruption and anti-
circumvention arguments cited by Beaumont as important governmental interests justifying the 
corporate contribution prohibition.107 As a result, Beaumont is not only binding precedent but also 
consistent with Citizens United’s analysis.108 
Nonetheless, Beaumont drew heavily on the older strain in campaign finance law which treated 
corporations as an especially troublesome threat to the “integrity of the political process.”109 As 
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Beaumont put it, the “special characteristics of the corporate structure” enable corporations to convert 
their “earnings . . . into political ‘war chests’” that pose a special danger of political corruption.110 
Citizens United completely disavowed this line of thinking. The state-enabled capital-amassers of earlier 
cases are now simply “associations of citizens”111 engaged in constitutionally protected political activity.   
Targeting corporations impoverishes the electoral debate by “prevent[ing] their voices and viewpoints 
from reaching the public and advising voters on which persons or entities are hostile to their 
interests.”112 Citizens United emphasized that “the First Amendment does not permit Congress to make . 
. . categorical distinctions based on the corporate identity of the speaker.”113 Even if the expenditure 
ban at issue in Citizens United is distinguishable from the contribution prohibition upheld in Beaumont, 
the Roberts Court’s “corporations-are-people-too” approach surely alters the doctrinal climate for 
considering special restrictions on corporations. As the Eighth Circuit observed, Beaumont’s precedential 
value rests on “shaky ground.”114 Preserving the corporate contribution ban will require a justification 
other than the concerns about corporate wealth and power and the state-created advantages intrinsic 
to the corporate form which shaped the law in this area from the late nineteenth century onward.  
Those arguments will focus primarily on Buckley v. Valeo’s principal justifications for 
contribution limitations – the prevention of corruption and the appearance of corruption – together 
with the Court’s repeated determination, beginning with Buckley, that some restrictions may also be 
justified as necessary to prevent circumvention or evasion of anti-corruption measures. The interplay of 
anti-corruption and anti-circumvention in the aftermath of Citizens United and McCutcheon will be 
addressed in Part IV. But it is also worth considering an argument that has been central for the case for 
limits on corporations since the start of the last century and was relied on in Beaumont115 but dismissed 
in Citizens United116 – the protection of dissenting shareholders. To be sure, one appeals court117 and 
one commentator118 have concluded that the shareholder-protection interest is no longer available to 
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justify the corporate contribution ban, but that over-reads Citizens United.119 Expenditure limitations are 
subject to more searching judicial review than contribution restrictions. Moreover, the “procedures of 
corporate democracy” Citizens United invoked are unlikely to adequately protect dissenting shareholder 
interests. Shareholder-protection ought to be able to justify the contribution ban, at least as to publicly-
held multi-shareholder corporations. 
C. Shareholder Protection after Citizens United 
The shareholder-protection justification draws on multiple concerns. First, corporate executives 
may use treasury funds to advance their own interests, which may be adverse to those of shareholders. 
In 1905 the Armstrong Committee accused New York mutual life insurance companies of using 
policyholder funds to win legislative support for measures limiting the ability of policyholders to sue 
managers for breach of trust. More recently, one study that compared states with bans on corporate 
independent spending before Citizens United with states that permitted such spending found that states 
without limits on corporate spending were far more likely to adopt corporate anti-takeover laws that 
protected incumbent managers from hostile takeovers and thereby decreased incentives for 
management to run their firms as efficiently as possible.120   
Second, even if corporate spending is not actually opposed to the interests of shareholders, it 
still may not be in the interest of the firm. A growing academic literature has found that, with the 
exception of firms dependent on government contracts or operating in heavily regulated industries, 
corporate political spending does not result in greater economic returns for the firm.121  Rather, there is 
some evidence that firms that invest in political activity – again other than firms that are government 
contractors or in heavily regulated fields -- actually do worse than other firms. According to some 
studies, firms that invest in politics do not invest as much in research and development or physical 
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capital as other firms and they may be more likely to engage in risky strategies.122  These studies suggest 
that corporate political activity is also often associated with higher levels of senior executive 
independence. In effect, corporate election spending is less an investment that increases shareholder 
wealth and more a “consumption good” for senior managers seeking to advance their partisan 
commitments, ideological beliefs, or personal careers. Harvard Law School Professor John Coates 
reports that a significant number of the CEOs and senior managers whose firms engaged in above-
average political activity went on to be appointed or nominated to high level public office.123 
The controversy following Target Corporation’s 2010 donation of $150,000 to Minnesota 
Forward -- a Section 527 committee jointly organized by the Minnesota Chamber of Commerce and the 
Minnesota Business Partnership to support pro-business candidates in Minnesota state elections – 
indicates another way corporate spending can hurt a company.124 Minnesota Forward used the funds 
provided by Target, the well-known Minnesota-based retailer, and other corporations to pay for 
independent spending in support of the Republican candidate for governor, who opposed marriage 
equality for same-sex couples. Target had made a point of its “gay-friendly” policies, so that when its 
donation became known the firm became the “target” of protests, a highly publicized consumer 
boycott, and a media campaign, including hostile YouTube videos by gay rights groups and the politically 
liberal MoveOn.org. It is not clear if the boycott affected company sales or stock price,125 but the 
company’s CEO quickly apologized to its employees, saying that although the “intent” of its contribution 
had been to “support economic growth and job creation” it recognized that its action had “affected 
many of you in a way I had not anticipated.” Target also said it would begin a “strategic review and 
analysis of our decision-making process for financial contributions in the public policy arena.” The Target 
episode and other instances of attempted consumer boycotts aimed at companies that donate to 
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controversial causes126 suggest the potential for reputational risk and resulting harm to investors when a 
company’s political donations become known.127 
Even if a corporation’s election spending may be in the interest of the organization as a whole it 
may not be in the interest of all shareholders. Corporate shareholders are presumably interested in 
using their investment to increase their wealth. But shareholders – or, at least, the individuals among 
them – are not just investors; they may also be parents, employees, retirees, consumers, 
environmentalists, community residents, and citizens with a host of interests and concerns that are 
affected by electoral politics and that in turn affect their individual views about elections. Their interests 
as parents or consumers or citizens may differ from their interests as investors. As investors, they might 
be better off with lower corporate taxes and weaker environmental or consumer protection regulations. 
But as citizens, consumers, or users of public services they may prefer higher corporate taxes or more 
stringent rules. When it comes time to vote in an election, each investor-consumer-parent-citizen has to 
balance out these potentially conflicting preferences and values and make a decision, a decision in 
which the non-investment interests could come out ahead. As a shareholder, an individual might be 
better off if her firm supports the anti-tax, anti-regulation candidate, because of all her other interests, 
that individual might vote for the candidate concerned about better funding for public schools and 
addressing the emission of greenhouse gases that contribute to climate change. When corporate 
managers make campaign contributions they do not take the shareholders’ non-investment interests 
into account, nor is it easy to see how they could given their fiduciary duty to the corporation.  In other 
words, a fundamental problem with the use of corporate treasury funds in elections is not the misuse of 
shareholder funds against shareholder economic interests but the overrepresentation of shareholders’ 
economic interest relative – and in opposition to -- their other interests.   
 In both of the Supreme Court’s cases dealing with restrictions on corporate contributions, the 
Court found that shareholder protection justified the federal corporate contribution ban. In NRWC, a 
unanimous Court noted that one argument put forward for the prohibition on the contribution of 
                                                          
126
 See, e.g., Center for Political Accountability, Taking Initiative: How corporate contributions to ballot measures 
pose a risk to shareholders, and why directors must oversee company political spending 38-54 (Dec. 2008) 
(discussing consumer boycotts aimed at companies that donated to controversial ballot proposition campaigns) 
127
 See, e.g., Michael Stocker & Matthew Moehlman, “Are Shareholders Happy With Your Company’s Political 
Spending,” Corporate Counsel, Sept. 26, 2012,  http://knowledgenetwork.labaton.com/upload/2012_415-2.pdf; 
Rick Cohen, “What to Do about  ‘Reputational Risk’ to Nonprofits from Political Spending,” NonProfit Quarterly, 
March 23, 2012, http://www.nonprofitquarterly.org/policysocial-context/20018-what-to-do-about-reputational-
risk-to-nonprofits-from-political-spending.html.  
28 
 
corporate treasury funds is to “protect the individuals who have paid money into a corporation or union 
for purposes other than the support of candidates from having that money used to support political 
candidates to whom they may be opposed” and it “agree[d] with the government” that this was a 
constitutionally sound justification.128 Beaumont quoted the NRWC language and restated the point.129 
 Citizens United did not directly address or reject the argument that shareholder protection is a 
compelling interest – the standard in an expenditure limit case – let alone a “sufficiently important” 
interest that would justify a contribution restriction. Instead, the Court concluded that the federal 
corporate spending ban was insufficiently narrowly tailored because it was both underinclusive – it 
applied to “corporate speech in only certain media within 30 or 60 days before an election” -- and 
“overinclusive because it covers all corporations, including nonprofit corporations and for-profit 
corporations with only single shareholders.”130 The federal corporate contribution ban is not 
underinclusive as it applies to all donations to federal candidates, national political party committees, 
and other political committees that give to candidates. The overinclusiveness concern is more apposite. 
Beaumont held that the federal corporate contribution ban applied to nonprofit corporations without 
shareholders, but that was due to the ban’s role in advancing the anti-corruption and anti-circumvention 
concerns, not shareholder protection. If the only argument for barring corporate contributions was 
shareholder protection, nonprofits and single-shareholder corporations would have to be exempted. 
However, the shareholder-protection argument could justify the ban with respect to contributions by 
multi-shareholder, publicly traded for-profit corporations. The Court in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, 
Inc. took a similar approach in recognizing the distinction between publicly traded and closely held 
corporations and providing only the latter the opportunity to assert religious objections to the 
application of the federal mandate that employers provide their employees with health insurance 
coverage for certain contraceptive methods. The “corporate giants” that Hobby Lobby found would be 
unlikely to assert a religious objection because of the wide range of religious beliefs among their 
“unrelated shareholders – including institutional investors with their own set of stakeholders”131 are 
precisely the corporations whose shareholders need protection against the misuse of corporate funds 
for political purposes they do not share. An MCFL-type exclusion for single shareholder, closed 
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corporations, and non-profits would solve the overinclusiveness problem for the shareholder-protection 
justification. 
 Citizens United hinted at an alternative reason the shareholder-protection interest failed to save 
the corporate spending ban. The Court contended that shareholder protection could be effectively 
advanced with less burden on First Amendment rights “’through the procedures of corporate 
democracy.’”132  Chief Justice Roberts made a similar point in the Citizens United oral argument when it 
contended it is “extraordinarily paternalistic for the government to take the position that shareholders 
are too stupid to keep track of what their corporations are doing and can’t sell their shares” if they 
object to corporate political activity.133  
But in fact it is extremely difficult for shareholders “to keep track of what their corporations are 
doing,” or to use the “procedures of shareholder democracy” to defend their interests. Corporations are 
under no legal obligation to disclose their election spending to shareholders. To be sure, in recent years, 
many major corporations have agreed to report to their shareholders about their political activities,134 
but these reports are often limited to a general statement of corporate political spending policies or 
total amounts of spending and do not necessarily include the amounts donated to or spent 
independently for or against particular candidates. 135 And the vast majority of corporations have no self-
imposed reporting policies at all.  Election laws do generally require the disclosure of contributions and 
expenditures, but these reports are made to public agencies, not to shareholders; moreover, it is the 
recipients of the contributions, not the donors, who are required to disclose, again making it difficult for 
shareholders to keep track of what their corporations are up to.136  
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Even if a shareholder is informed about a particular corporation’s campaign activity there is little 
she can do about it. Voluntary corporate disclosures are made in annual reports released long after the 
election in which the contributions were made, and even election law disclosures – though often 
reported before Election Day so as to inform the voters – report contributions only after they have 
occurred. At that point the sale of shares would be too late from the unhappy shareholder’s perspective 
as the damage is already done. Further, any post-disclosure sale of shares could require the shareholder 
to take a loss or trigger the application of a capital gains tax. Either consequence would operate as a 
monetary penalty discouraging sale. And, of course, many people do not directly own shares in the 
corporation that engages in election spending but instead invest through mutual funds or pension plans. 
Disinvesting would require selling the interest in the mutual fund (thereby potentially disinvesting from 
dozens of other companies with which the investor has no political quarrel); for many employment-
based pension plans it may not even be possible for the employee- or retiree- investor to change plans. 
As for “object[ing] in the corporate context,” it is not clear what that means. General corporate 
law principles vest the vast majority of corporate policy-making decisions in management. That includes 
the decisions whether to make campaign contributions and how much and to whom to give are for 
management. Shareholders have no legal say on these questions. A recent Securities & Exchange 
Commission ruling – which applies only to the public companies traded on the exchanges subject to its 
jurisdictions – requires companies to place shareholder-initiated resolutions concerning company 
political spending on the annual meeting proxy statements for a shareholder vote.137 But under general 
corporate law principles such a shareholder resolution must be advisory only and cannot bind the 
company. The closest the shareholders get to having a voice is when they vote for the members of the 
board of directors, although in only a little more than half of large public companies do the boards of 
directors “regularly oversee” company political spending.138 Of course, elections to the board of 
directors are only rarely contested. Typically, the board itself nominates a slate, which it places on the 
corporation’s proxy card, and the slate runs unopposed. And even if there is an election contest, a 
shareholder discontented with a company’s campaign contributions may still think the incumbent board 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
for 2014 the political spending rulemaking petition was not on it. See Dina ElBoghdady, “SEC drops disclosure of 
political spending from its priority list,” Wash. Post, Nov. 30, 2013. 
137
 SEC, Shareholder Proposal Submitted by Home Depot to NorthStar Asset Management Funded Pension Plan, 
March 25, 2011. 
138
 Id. at 16. 
31 
 
has generally done a good job in running the company. As a result, the exercise of “voice,” like the 
exercise of “exit” through sale, to protest corporate election spending is also discouraged.139    
Nor are there less restrictive alternatives to a complete ban that would adequately protect 
dissenting shareholders. Employees required to pay a fee to the union that represents them in collective 
bargaining are entitled to “opt-out” of the union’s political spending to which they object by obtaining a 
dues reduction proportionate to the share of the union’s political spending.140 Professor Ben Sachs has 
proposed that shareholders be given a comparable opt-out right which would be realized as an annual 
dividend equal to their pro rata share of the company’s political expenditures.141 But as even Professor 
Sachs acknowledges, “such a rule would be difficult to administer,”142 probably fatally so. With many 
investors buying and selling stock on a frequent if not daily basis, it will be extremely difficult to 
determine what any stockholder’s pro rata share of corporate assets will be on an annual basis. Many 
shareholders invest through mutual funds, which also buy and sell shares throughout the year, making 
the shareholder’s stake in any one company even more difficult to calculate.143 And as Professor Sachs 
notes, “corporations do not have an obligation to pay dividends to shareholders at any set time or based 
on any particular set of financial circumstances” so that a political opt-out right “that took the form of a 
mandatory dividend would be novel in U.S. law.”144 Other scholars have recognized that “[a]dministering 
an objection system would be complex, particularly for shareholders whose stocks are managed by a 
pension or mutual fund. Sending out rebate checks as dividends . . . would not be a simple task.”145 The 
differences between the very specific annual agency fee assessment imposed on employees and the 
constantly fluctuating investment a shareholder has in a specific corporation mean that opt-out is not a 
feasible or adequate alternative in the corporate context.146   
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 Alternatively, corporate contributions could be conditioned on a shareholder vote. The United 
Kingdom requires that any company that intends to spend more than £5,000 on campaign activity must 
first obtain the approval of its shareholders.  The British law does not require shareholder approval of 
specific donations or expenditures but instead provides general authority to use corporate funds for 
political purposes and the total amount that may be spent until either the next annual meeting of the 
shareholders or over the next four years.147 Given that any shareholder vote would probably occur at 
the corporation’s annual meeting, which will likely be held at a time unrelated to any elections calendar, 
it seems inevitable that shareholder authorization would be address only the overall level or, perhaps, 
type of political expenditure – contributions, independent expenditures, support for candidates, parties, 
ballot propositions, political committees – but not the identity of amounts spent with respect to specific 
beneficiaries or recipients.148 It is also unclear what fraction of shareholders would be necessary to 
approve a corporation’s electoral spending. Only a 100% rule would fully protect the interests of all 
potentially dissenting shareholders,149 but that would be tantamount to a ban.150  
Citizens United has surely lain to rest for some time to come the question of whether 
shareholder-protection can justify a ban on corporate treasury fund spending, but that does not resolve 
the issue of whether than interest can justify a contribution ban. The Court has determined that 
contribution restrictions are less of a burden on First Amendment interests and so are subject to a less 
rigorous degree of scrutiny – merely that they be “closely drawn” to match a “sufficiently important 
interest.”151 The Court has repeatedly recognized shareholder protection as an important interest; 
Citizens United did not question that and instead focused on the tailoring of the spending ban to the 
interest and the availability of alternative, less burdensome means of vindicating that interest. However, 
                                                          
147
 See Michael Smyth, Patricia Barratt and Fraser Campbell, The Law of Political Donations 122-24 (Wildy, 
Simmonds & Hill Pub.  2012). For a call for Americans to adopt the British approach, see Ciara Torres-Spelliscy & 
Kathy Fogel, “Shareholder-Authorized Corporate Political Spending in the United Kingdom,” 46 U.S.F.L. Rev. 525 
(2011). 
148
 Shareholders vote on a one share, one vote not a one person, one vote basis. Most of the shares of large, 
publicly traded companies are held by institutional investors, such as mutual funds and private pension plans, and 
most individuals who own stock do so through such funds and plans. See Jennifer S. Taub, “Money Managers in the 
Middle: Seeing and Sanctioning Political Spending After Citizens United,” 15 Legis. & Pol’y 443, 462 (2012). As a 
result, a shareholder approval requirement might simply give decision-making authority to a small number of 
powerful money managers. As Taub tartly put it, “[i]f the procedures of corporate democracy are lacking, the 
procedures of mutual fund democracy are nearly non-existent.” Id. at 483. 
149
 See Victor Brudney, “Business Corporations and Stockholders’ Rights Under the First Amendment,” 91 Yale L.J. 
235, 259-60 (1981). 
150
 Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., “Corporate Political Speech: Who Decides?” 124 Harv. L. Rev. 83, 115 
(2010). 
151
 FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. at 162. 
33 
 
as McCutcheon observed, in the context of contribution restrictions, what is required for a law to be 
“closely drawn” is “a fit that is . . . reasonable; that represents not necessarily the single best disposition 
but one whose scope is ‘in proportion to the interest served,’ . . . that employs not necessarily the least 
restrictive means but . . . a means narrowly tailored to achieve the desired objective.”152 The 
contribution ban is not underinclusive as was the expenditure restriction in Citizens United; the 
overinclusiveness problem can be addressed by an MCFL-type exception; and there is no less restrictive 
means of protecting shareholder interests than a complete ban on the contribution of corporate 
treasury funds. When coupled with the mechanism in current law of allowing the corporation to 
maintain a PAC which can make campaign contributions and to use corporate funds to solicit voluntary 
donations to that PAC from shareholders, the burden of the ban on the ability of people associated with 
a corporation to make a contribution that reflects the fact of that association is greatly reduced.  The 
ban-plus-PAC option may not have been sufficiently narrowly tailored to justify a ban on corporate 
spending, given the extremely high value the Court has placed on spending aimed at the general public 
and the strict scrutiny applied to restrictions on such spending. But given the different standard of 
review for contribution restrictions, shareholder protection (for the shareholders of multi-shareholder 
for-profit corporations) is a sufficiently important interest, and the ban (with PAC option) 
proportionately tailored to protect that interest to justify the ban. 
IV. Corruption and Circumvention 
A. Anti-corruption 
From Buckley on, the Supreme Court has consistently held that contributions may be restricted 
because of the important governmental interests in preventing corruption and the appearance of 
corruption. As the Court explained, “[t]o the extent that large contributions are given to secure a 
political quid pro quo from current and potential office holders, the integrity of our system of 
representative democracy is undermined.”153 And the corruption danger justifying contribution limits  
goes beyond “the giving and taking of bribes,” which are “only the most blatant and specific attempts of 
those with money to influence governmental action.”154 Rather, as the Court subsequently observed, 
the anti-corruption concern is “not confined to bribery of public officials, but extend[s] to the broader 
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threat from politicians too compliant with the wishes of large contributors.”155 Buckley also found “[o]f 
almost equal concern as the danger of actual quid pro quo arrangements is the impact of the 
appearance of corruption stemming from opportunities for abuse inherent in a regime of large 
individual financial contributions. . . . Congress could legitimately conclude that the avoidance of the 
appearance of improper influence ‘is also critical . . . if confidence in the system of representative 
government is not to be eroded to a disastrous extent.’”156 Although contribution restrictions burden 
the freedom of association Buckley found that even a “significant interference” with the right of 
association may be sustained if the government “demonstrates a sufficiently important interest and 
employs means closely drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgment of associational freedoms.”157 The 
prevention of corruption and the appearance of corruption were held to meet that standard. 
The Court has consistently adhered to this position over the last four decades.158 Contribution 
restrictions have occasionally been invalidated when the Court deemed them to be unrelated to the 
prevention of corruption – such as limits on donations to ballot measure committees,159 or limits on the 
total amount an individual can give to all candidates and committees160 -- or when the  limits were so 
low as to interfere with the ability of candidates, particularly challengers, to compete effectively.161 
Citizens United restated the difference in the treatment of expenditure and contribution restrictions and 
Buckley’s validation of “limits on direct contributions in order to ensure against the reality and 
appearance of corruption.”162 Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion for the Court in McCutcheon noted that the 
parties and amici had spent “significant energy debating whether the line Buckley drew between 
contributions and expenditures should remain the law,” but determined there was “no need in this case 
to revisit Buckley’s distinction between contributions and expenditures and the corollary distinction in 
the applicable standards of review.”163 While hardly a ringing reaffirmation of the traditional doctrine, 
the Chief Justice’s opinion indicated that the anti-corruption justification Buckley relied on “may 
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properly be labeled ‘compelling,’”164 and so could be a basis for sustaining contribution restrictions even 
if the Court were to impose the strict scrutiny heretofore reserved for expenditure restrictions. 
Of course, Buckley and the Court’s other cases relying on the anti-corruption interest to sustain 
restrictions on individual contributions addressed dollar limits on donations not complete bans. To 
justify a complete ban on corporate treasury fund donations requires turning to the closely related 
concern with preventing evasion of the dollar limits on individual donations – the anti-circumvention 
justification invoked by Beaumont when it upheld the corporate donation ban – and it involves doing so 
in light of the tighter review of closeness of fit embraced by McCutcheon. 
B. Anti-Circumvention 
The Supreme Court first recognized an anti-circumvention justification for restricting campaign 
finance activity in Buckley itself. In sustaining FECA’s $25,000 limit on the total contributions an 
individual may give to federal candidates, parties and political committees in a calendar year – in 
addition to the dollar limit on how much an individual may give to any particular candidate -- the Court 
found the aggregate limit justified by the concern “to prevent evasion of the $1000 contribution 
limitation by a person who might otherwise contribute massive amounts of money to a particular 
candidate through the use of unearmarked contributions to political committees likely to contribute to 
that candidate, or huge contributions to the candidate’s political party.”165 It was thus “no more than a 
corollary of the basic individual contribution limitation that we have found to be constitutionally 
valid.”166 Although McCutcheon concluded that due to subsequent changes in campaign finance law 
FECA’s aggregate limit is no longer needed to prevent circumvention of the limits on individual 
donations to candidates, it did not challenge circumvention-prevention as a justification for laws 
intended to backstop contribution limits. 
Indeed, the Court has frequently turned to the prevention of the evasion of the limits on direct 
donations to candidates as a justification for other contribution restrictions. In California Medical Ass’n 
v. FEC,167 the Court sustained FECA’s limit on the amount of money an unincorporated association can 
contribute to its own PAC. Although there was no danger the association would “corrupt” its PAC, the 
measure was needed “to prevent circumvention” of the individual- and association-to-candidate 
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donation limits previously upheld in Buckley.168 Similarly, in FEC v. Colorado Republican Federal 
Campaign Comm. (“Colorado Republican”),169 the Court upheld the federal statutory limits on 
expenditures by a political party that are coordinated with the party’s candidate as a constitutionally 
valid means “to minimize circumvention of contribution limits” on individual donations to candidates.170 
The majority opinion explained that “all Members of the Court agree that circumvention is a valid theory 
of corruption.”171 As previously noted, the prevention of circumvention was one of the justifications 
Beaumont gave for upholding the federal corporate contribution ban, even when applied to nonprofit 
corporations. And in McConnell v. FEC172 the Court repeatedly invoked the anti-circumvention 
justification in support of the extension of the ban on soft money contributions to the national political 
parties to the funding of the federal election activities of state political parties;173 to solicitations by 
national, state and local political parties of donations by tax-exempt organizations;174 and to the funding 
of the public communications of state and local officeholders concerning federal candidates.175 Although 
McCutcheon indicates that the Court will more closely probe the fit between the seriousness of a 
circumvention problem and the restriction intended to prevent it,176 there is nothing in the Court’s 
recent campaign finance jurisprudence that suggests that prevention of the circumvention of 
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corruption-preventing and appearance-of-corruption-preventing contribution limits is no longer a 
constitutionally substantial interest capable of justifying a campaign finance restriction. 
The possibility that individuals would use the ability of corporations to make donations to evade 
the limits on individual donations is surely substantial. It is extremely easy to create a corporation. In 
most states a new corporation can be formed simply by filing a few papers and paying a nominal fee. A 
single individual can generate multiple corporations that he or she controls and can use to end-run the 
cap on donations. The adoption of a dollar limit on the size of an individual’s donations to a candidate 
would be meaningless if the individual could proliferate new corporations, each of which could 
separately donate to the same candidate. Similarly, enabling corporations to participate in election 
campaigns can lead to the frustration of disclosure requirements, as a donor can easily disguise his role 
in a campaign by creating and putting money in a corporation which contributes to a candidate. 
Individuals may be able to use their minor children to evade contribution limits but it is far easier and 
quicker to generate multiple corporations (not to mention not having to pay for their college 
educations). 
The use of corporations to evade disclosure requirements became a regular occurrence after 
Citizens United authorized corporate independent spending. In one notorious incident, an entity known 
as Specialty Group, Inc., which was first incorporated on September 26, 2012,177  contributed 
$10,575,000 million to FreedomWorks for America, an independent expenditure political committee 
between October 1 and November 1, 2012.178 That made Specialty Group, Inc. the fourth largest donor 
to independent spending groups in the 2012 election.179 FreedomWorks itself was the sixth largest 
outside spender in 2012, and Specialty Group accounted for more than half of its funds.180 However, 
according to news accounts, “Specialty Group appeared to have no website describing its products or 
services,” gave as its address a Knoxville, Tennessee residence, and was not required to make any 
disclosure concerning the source of its funds.  
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Similarly, corporations and similar artificial entities like limited liability corporations (LLCs) can 
go out of existence, change names, re-form, or work through subsidiaries or affiliates in ways that at the 
very least hinder the ability of media, voters, and campaign finance agencies to track the flow of funds 
from original donor to ultimate campaign recipients.181 In the Western Tradition Partnership (“WTP”) 
litigation, -- this is the post-Citizens United case in which Montana unsuccessfully sought to sustain its 
century-old ban on corporate campaign spending in state elections -- the Montana Supreme Court 
found that WTP – despite the word “partnership” in its name, the entity is a corporation – was created 
“to act as a conduit of funds for persons and entities including corporations who want to spend money 
anonymously to influence Montana elections.”182 Often little more than “shadow money mailboxes,”183 
these legal persons have become a key mechanism for evading campaign finance laws. The ease with 
which politically-active artificial entities can be proliferated, reorganized and dissolved makes the 
enforcement of constitutionally sound campaign finance laws far more difficult. If these entities could 
make direct contributions to candidates as well as engage in independent spending, those difficulties 
would be further exacerbated. 
Corporations have quickly come to play a large and growing role in enabling donors to avoid 
disclosure. As Ann Ravel, then-chair of California’s Fair Political Practices Commission (FPPC) and now a 
member of the Federal Election Commission, has observed, “people are willing to use circuitous routes 
to avoid telling the voters who is behind campaigns.”184 Ravel made her statement while announcing the 
imposition of a record $1 million civil fine as part of the settlement of a case brought by the FPPC and 
the California Attorney General against two nonprofit corporations that together funneled more than 
$15 million into a campaign against two ballot propositions – dealing with taxes and union political 
rights --- on the 2012 California ballot. The money, which ultimately derived from a handful of 
superwealthy individuals, was channeled from the originating donors to a group called Americans for 
Job Security, which then transferred the money to the Center to Protect Patients’ Rights (the ballot 
propositions had nothing to do with patients’ rights) and then on to the Arizona-based Americans for 
Responsible Leadership and the Iowa-based American Future Fund before the funds were finally being 
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sent on to the Small Business Action Committee and the California Future Fund for Free Markets for 
spending to oppose the ballot measures.185 It was, as one news account put it, “a daisy chain of 
organizations” “that operatives took to skirt disclosure obligations.”186 Similarly, Western Tradition 
Partnership touted to prospective donors: “’[W]e’re not required to report the name or the amount of 
any contribution that we receive. So if you decide to support this program, no politician, no bureaucrat, 
and no radical environmentalist will ever know you helped make this program possible. . . . You can just 
sit back on election night and see what a difference you have made.”187 
It is not difficult to imagine corporations, if allowed to make campaign contributions, playing a 
similar role in enabling individuals to evade the limits on individual donations. The role of corporations 
in channeling funds to SuperPACs engaged in independent spending could easily provide a model for 
individuals seeking to enhance their ability to make contributions to candidates beyond the statutory 
ceiling. An individual who has “maxed out” on her permissible donation to a candidate could then also 
create a corporation, fund that entity, and use that entity to make another legally permissible maximum 
contribution. A recent investigation of campaign practices in New York State, which permits 
contributions by both corporations and LLCs, found that it is standard practice for organizations to 
generate LLCs and subsidiaries to make campaign contributions. The New York study found that one 
entity had utilized 25 separate LLCs and subsidiary entities to make 147 separate political contributions 
totaling more than $3.1 million over a four-year period.188 Alternatively, nonprofit corporations that 
engage in a mix of electoral and other forms of political activity could be used as conduits for additional 
contributions to candidates. To be sure, corporate contributions to candidates would likely be smaller 
than the hundreds of millions spent by SuperPACs if Congress responds to any invalidation of the 
corporate spending ban with the enactment of a monetary limit on corporate donations similar to those 
currently imposed on individual and PAC donations.189  But they would still enable individuals to give 
more than the individual-to-candidate limits that the courts have found to be valid.  
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The anti-circumvention argument has most purchase for single-shareholder, closely-held, and 
non-profit corporations – precisely those corporations for which the shareholder-protection argument is 
least persuasive. These are the entities most likely to be dominated by a small number of individuals 
who can use them to advance their personal political concerns. With these organizations, the problem is 
not the corporate “warchest” concern underlying Austin that Citizens United so powerfully repudiated 
but the ease with which they can be deployed to circumvent the limits on individual donations to 
candidates. The anti-circumvention concern also explains why an absolute ban, rather than a dollar limit 
on corporate donations comparable to that on individual donations is needed. Assuming there are 
substantial if not compelling public interests in preventing corruption and the appearance of corruption 
that validates the statutory dollar limits on individual donations, then every dollar above the statutory 
limit that is channeled through a corporation triggers those interests.  
After McCutcheon, the main question for the corporate contribution ban is whether it is 
sufficiently narrowly tailored to preventing the use of the corporate form to circumvent the limits on 
individual donations, or whether there are alternative less burdensome means of achieving that goal. In 
McCutcheon, the Court focused on three sets of factors in determining whether a restrictions is 
sufficiently narrowly tailored for it to be justified by the anti-circumvention interest: (i) the existence of 
other legal rules addressing circumvention;190 (ii) the practical likelihood of circumvention if the 
challenged restriction were eliminated;191 and (iii) the burden on the restriction on First Amendment 
rights in light of the availability of other forms of campaign participation.  
In McCutcheon’s aggregate limit context, the Court concluded that there were multiple other 
campaign finance laws that either already prevented or could be adopted to prevent circumvention of 
contribution limits, such as limits on donations by individuals to political committees,192 limits on donors 
creating or controlling multiple affiliated political committees,193 limits on donations to political 
committees that support or which the donor anticipates will support a candidate the donor has directly 
supported,194 limits on committee-to-committee and candidate-to-committee transfers,195 and 
strengthened rules on earmarking, that is, the practice of giving to a political committee with an implicit 
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understanding that the committee will use the donation to aid a specific candidate.196 But these rules 
would not preclude the use of the corporate form to evade individual-to-candidate contribution limits. 
There are, of course, no federal laws that limit the number of corporations an individual can create, the 
amount of money an individual can invest in a for-profit corporation or donate to a nonprofit 
corporation, or controls on the ability of directors, executives, shareholders, or donors to a nonprofit to 
influence the election-related activities of a corporation. Although a corporation could be subject to the 
restrictions applicable to political committees,197 the Supreme Court has interpreted the statutory 
definition of “political committee” to apply only to organizations that have the “major purpose” of 
nominating or election of a candidate.198 As a result, any business corporation – both large public 
companies and closely held companies like Hobby Lobby -- or a nonprofit that engages primarily in 
spending that falls outside the definition of election-related activity, including political advertising that 
does not consist of express advocacy or the functional equivalent of express advocacy, would probably 
not be considered a “political committee” and not subject to the constraints that were crucial to 
McCutcheon’s finding of alternative statutory or potential statutory limitations on circumvention. The 
earmarking restrictions would do little good in limiting the ability of donors who are also dominant 
voices in the corporations on whose boards they sit, manage, or own shares, as they need not make any 
“contribution” to the corporation as a predicate to directing the corporation to making a contribution to  
candidates to whom they have already given the maximum contribution. Nor would they need to 
formally earmark any contribution they do make if they also control the decisions of the corporations 
that receive the funds. As the Court previously observed in Colorado Republican, relying on the anti-
earmarking rule “ignores the practical difficulty of identifying and directly combating circumvention 
under actual political conditions.”199 Similarly, although rules could be framed that attempt to subject all 
related entities to a single contribution ceiling, such rules would likely be difficult to administer. 
Corporations can be structured to avoid formal affiliations or with complex ownership structures, so 
determining whether and how two or more firms are connected can be a difficult task for enforcement 
agencies. 
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In McCutcheon, the Court focused on the practical unlikelihood that donors who have “maxed 
out” on their donations to the candidates they support would take advantage of the elimination of 
aggregate contribution limits by channeling additional contributions to those candidates through 
contributions to political party committees or the committees of other candidates. According to the 
Court, “all indications are that many types of recipients have scant interest in regifting donations they 
receive.”200 More specifically, “state parties rarely contribute to candidates in other States,”201 and 
“candidates contribute only a small fraction of their campaign funds to other candidates.”202 As the 
Court explained, both political parties and candidates have their own distinct electoral interests, which 
may not include donating to specific candidates favored by certain donors. But the political interests of 
the many small corporations controlled by their principal shareholders or nonprofits controlled by their 
executives or boards are likely to be exactly the same as those of their shareholders, executives, and 
boards. These firms may be entities legally distinct from their shareholders, managers, and directors, but 
when it comes to politics – like the religious beliefs at issue in Hobby Lobby – their electoral goals may 
be precisely the same as their shareholders and others than control them. In other words, they are less 
intermediaries like political parties and more alter egos for their shareholders and controlling individuals 
who are practically quite capable of using the corporate form for circumvention of the individual 
donation limits. 
As for the magnitude of the burden on First Amendment rights in light of the availability of other 
forms of campaign participation, McCutcheon emphasized that the aggregate donation limit prevented 
donors from giving the non-corrupting base limit amount to as many candidates as they wanted, and 
that other means of providing support, such as personally volunteering for those candidates, were not 
“a realistic alternative for those who wish to support a wide variety of candidates or causes.”203 The 
corporate contribution ban is a much less burdensome restriction on the rights of the individuals 
affiliated with a corporation. After McCutcheon, those individuals have the right to contribute the base 
amount to as many candidates as they desire. The corporate contribution ban simply limits their ability 
to give more than the base amount to a candidate. The ban does restrict the ability of individuals 
associated with a corporation to give as a group by having the contribution given by the corporation, but 
other means of providing support from the corporation are available. Given Citizens United, the 
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corporation can engage in unlimited independent spending. Although not a perfect substitute for a 
donation, McCutcheon noted that “from the donor’s point of view” this is still a valuable alternative.204 
Such independent spending also provides information to voters and the public about the corporation’s 
views about the election. And, of course, the law provides an alternative mechanism for individuals 
associated with the corporation to support candidates in the name of the corporation – the PAC.  The 
corporation can establish a PAC, select its managers, spend corporate funds soliciting donations from 
individuals affiliated with the corporation, and exercise total authority over which candidates the PAC 
will support and how much – up to the statutory ceiling – those candidates will receive. Although 
Citizens United rejected the idea that a corporation’s ability to create a PAC and direct the spending of 
PAC funds solved the First Amendment problem posed by the banning of corporate independent 
spending,205 the PAC is a more adequate alternative in the contribution context. The Court has 
repeatedly held that there can be no limit but independent spending, but limiting a corporation’s 
spending to its PAC funds, with the size of individual donations to the PAC subject to a statutory ceiling, 
makes it likely the corporation will have less money to spend on elections than if it could also draw on 
its treasury funds. But assuming that corporate donations to individual candidates would be subject to a 
dollar cap, the requirement that the PAC draw its funds from voluntary donations from persons 
affiliated with the corporation is much less of a restriction on the ability of a corporation to contribute to 
a candidate. Moreover, as previously noted, the PAC device also protects dissenting shareholders from 
having their share of corporate resources given to candidates they do not support.206  
The combination of unlimited corporate independent spending and the availability of the 
corporate PAC device for contributions mitigates the burden on freedom of association posed by the 
corporate contribution ban.  Individuals associated with a corporation can still participate in campaign 
financing under the name of the corporation through its PAC, and the corporation as a distinct entity can 
still support candidates through the independent spending of treasury funds. The relatively modest 
burden on associational rights resulting from the corporate treasury fund contribution bans is surely not 
more than the “’significant interference’ with protected right of political association”207 that the Court 
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has repeatedly indicated it is willing to allow to prevent evasion of the important public interests in 
preventing corruption and its appearance that support limits on individual contributions to candidates. 
V. Conclusion 
The corporate contribution ban is closely drawn to accomplish two substantial public interests – 
the protection of dissenting shareholders and the prevention of the circumvention of the limits on 
individual contributions to candidates, which vindicate the public’s interests in preventing corruption 
and the appearance of corruption. The Supreme Court has repeatedly held these are important public 
interests; indeed, McCutcheon indicates that the anti-corruption interest is “compelling.” The two 
interests work in tandem, with the shareholder-protection interest most salient for publicly held for-
profit corporations, and anti-circumvention for closely held and for nonprofit corporations. Both 
interests support a complete ban, rather than a dollar limit, on corporate contributions as any corporate 
donations raise the prospect of the political use of money inconsistent with shareholder preferences or 
the evasion of the statutory caps on individual donations to candidates. And, as McCutcheon requires, 
the ban is proportionate to these interests.  There are no effective alternative mechanisms for 
vindicating these interests than the ban. Given management’s complete control over the decision 
whether to make campaign contributions, the “procedures of corporate democracy” are inadequate to 
protect dissenting shareholder interests. So, too, given the ease with which individuals have already 
used the corporate form to evade the disclosure of donors to entities that engage in independent 
spending, it is evident that the corporate form could easily be used to circumvent the individual 
contribution limits. And the corporate contribution ban still permits many forms of corporate 
participation in elections, including unlimited independent spending, and contributions by PACs created, 
financed and controlled by their parent corporations. 
Of course, this analysis depends on the Court’s continuing adherence to the 
contribution/expenditure distinction with its less stringent review of contribution restrictions. Buckley 
held that contributions are a less protected form of campaign finance activity than expenditures 
because a contribution “serves as a general expression of support for the candidate and his views, but 
does not communicate the underlying basis for the support. . . . While contributions may result in 
political expression if spent by a candidate or an association to present views to the voters, the 
transformation of contributions into political debate involves speech by someone other than a 
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contributor.”208 As a result, the Court has not applied strict scrutiny to contribution restrictions; has 
found that contribution controls can be justified by interests that are “weighty”209 even if not 
“compelling;” and have required restrictions to be “closely drawn” but “not necessarily the least 
restrictive means”210 to achieve the public interest the restriction is intended to vindicate. However, the 
Court has recently hinted that the more relaxed standard of review of contribution restrictions may be 
up for reconsideration.  
In McCutcheon, Chief Justice Roberts noted that the parties and amici had spent “significant 
energy” on the question “whether the line Buckley drew between contributions and expenditures 
should remain law.”211 The Court declined to reach the question or “parse the difference between the 
two standards” because it found that there was so “substantial” a “mismatch” between the  aggregate 
limit at issue in that case and the anti-corruption and anti-circumvention goals said to justify it that the 
limit flunked even Buckley’s less restrictive “closely drawn” test.212 In his concurring opinion, Justice 
Thomas called for applying strict scrutiny to contribution restrictions -- a position he has frequently 
taken before,213 occasionally joined by Justice Scalia.214 Justice Kennedy has also indicated some 
restiveness with the contribution/expenditure distinction.215 A few months after McCutcheon was 
handed down, in McCullen v. Coakley, the Court confirmed that McCutcheon had “assume[d], without 
deciding” whether Buckley’s “less stringent level of scrutiny applies,”216 implying that the Court is not 
necessarily still committed to Buckley’s approach.  Moreover, McCutcheon plainly ratcheted up the 
“closely drawn” test as it invalidated a contribution restriction Buckley had previously upheld – the first 
time the Court has overruled any part of Buckley. I have indicated that the corporate contribution ban 
can survive even McCutcheon’s tighter approach to narrow tailoring. But if McCutcheon is signaling the  
Court’s abandonment of Buckley’s “relatively complaisant review”217 of contributions then the 
contribution ban will be difficult, if not impossible, to sustain.  
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Citizens United rejected the shareholder-protection justification for an expenditure ban. If 
contribution restrictions are to receive the same treatment as expenditure regulations, then it would be 
unlikely shareholder protection could validate a contribution ban. And if contribution restrictions start 
to fall because they are insufficiently narrowly tailored to advance the anti-corruption interest, as Justice 
Thomas has contended, then the anti-circumvention justification would disappear because there would 
be no individual contribution restrictions to circumvent. In the end, then, the fate of the corporate 
contribution ban is likely to turn on the constitutional status of contribution limits generally rather than 
a particular jurisprudence of corporate campaign finance activity. 
There is, of course, a reasonable question as to whether the corporate contribution ban (or any 
contribution restrictions for that matter) make much sense in light of Citizens United and McCutcheon. 
In light of the ability of corporations, individuals, and a host of other campaign actors to spend as much 
as they want on communications aimed at the voters, and of wealthy individuals to give to an unlimited 
number of candidates, political party committees, and other political committees that support or 
oppose candidates, it is unclear exactly what contribution limits do to stem the influence of big spenders 
and donors on elections and on the governmental decisions of elected officials.  Even under the Court’s 
relatively narrow focus on the corruption of individual officeholders rather than on the impact of 
campaign money on the political system more broadly, it is undeniable that big independent spenders 
and mega-donors are able to use their campaign money to obtain greater political influence, even 
without the quid pro quos that the Court has made the focus of the corruption concern. So, why even 
bother attempting to defend the corporate contribution restriction? 
There are two answers to that. First, there may be some merit to the Court’s position that 
money given directly to a candidate is likely to be more valuable to the candidate dollar and, as a result, 
a source of greater influence for the donor than an equivalent amount of money spent independently in 
support of that candidate. Unlike independent spending, the candidate has complete control over the 
use of the donation, including whether it should be used for ads, and if so, the content of and audience 
for the ads. Independent spending can sometimes strike the wrong notes or distract from the 
candidate’s messages. Although there are modes of informal cooperation between spender and 
candidate that can allay this problem, it is surely the case that a candidate would prefer to have total 
control over his or her campaign’s money. Moreover, even when the candidate’s and the independent’s 
committees messages are in complete accord, candidate broadcast advertising can benefit from the 
requirement that candidates can be charged only the lowest unit rate while independent committees 
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may have to pay more for the same volume of advertising in the same markets. As a result, a dollar of 
candidate broadcast ad spending can go further than the independent spending dollar. To be sure, the 
ability of independent groups to engage in unlimited spending can offset some of the disadvantages of 
unlimited spending relative to contributions to a candidate, but dollar-for-dollar a candidate is likely to 
prefer, and feel more gratitude for, a contribution than an expenditure, so there may still be some anti-
corruption benefit in limiting contributions even when there are no limits on spending. 
Second, and perhaps more importantly, this article is concerned with the constitutionality of 
corporate contribution limits, not their wisdom. The question of whether the federal government, a 
state, or a locality decides to bar corporate contributions should be up to the elected representatives of 
the jurisdiction (or the voters in a jurisdiction with the voter initiative) not the courts. Campaign finance 
regulation involves highly contested issues of both political philosophy and empirical assessment of the 
impact of money on elections and governance. The Constitution provides no clear answers to these 
questions and it is far from obvious that unelected federal judges with little experience in electoral 
politics are better at resolving these questions than democratically accountable representatives or the 
voters themselves. Nonetheless, for close to forty years the Supreme Court has assumed a leading role 
in setting campaign finance policy and restricting the regulatory options available to the public. In so 
doing, the Court has followed a complex and inconsistent path, relying on difficult distinctions, and 
changing its position on such basic questions as the justifications for regulation and the deference due 
to elected decision-makers or the voters. In the past decade the Court has tightened its control, with a 
narrow majority striking down multiple federal and state laws, in decisions such as Citizens United and 
McCutcheon that have entailed overturning the Court’s own precedents. 
Given the lack of a clear constitutional mandate for the Court’s campaign finance jurisprudence, 
the difficulty the Court has experienced in developing workable doctrines or sticking with the rules it has 
articulated, and the general absence of obvious right answers for campaign finance law it would be 
desirable to leave some discretion to democratically accountable decision-makers. There is certainly a 
“laboratories of democracy” justification for such an approach: With some states barring corporate 
contributions and some allowing them, we can get a better understanding of their impact on elections, 
governance, and the interests of corporations, than if the bar is pronounced unconstitutional. And then 
there is the plain-old democracy justification for not striking down laws that have enjoyed public 
support for more than a century, have had no apparent deleterious impact on the political process,  
have not discriminated against any individuals or ideas, and have long been accepted as consistent with 
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prevailing constitutional doctrine. Barring  corporate contributions may or may not make sense in light 
of the constitutional protection for unlimited spending, but that judgment should be entrusted the 
democratic process, not the courts. 
 
  
